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THE PUBLIC USE LIMITATION ON EMINENT DOMAIN:
AN ADVANCE REQUIEM
LEGAL doctrines usually die quietly, if slowly. Their demise is generally
accompanied by no more than soft sighs of relief at the courts' final ac-
knowledgment of decay. But the theory of "public use" as a limitation on
eminent domain '--the notion that there are only certain limited "public
purposes" for which private property may be expropriated-bulked so
large in its prime and has taken so long in dying that, at the risk of disturb-
ing the death-watch, a few final words may be in order.
Despite the shibboleth that eminent domain was an "inherent attribute
of sovereignty," 2 the Federal Government did not assert its power of
eminent domain in its own name in its own courts until 1875.3 And until
the limitations of the Fifth Amendment on federal takings were applied to
the states under the Fourteenth Amendment in 1896, 4 state takings were not
1. See Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use is; the Law of Eminent Donair,, 20 B. U.
L. RMV. 615 (1940); Note, 21 N.Y.U. L. Q. REv. 285 (1946); 1 Lnwxs, THE LAv o,
ErmIN NT DomAI iN THE Uva'irm STATES c. VII (3d ed. 1909), hereinafter cited as
LEWIs; 1 NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EunmNr DoMAIN c.c. IV-VI (2d ed. 1917), hereinafter
cited as NICHOLS; RANDoLrPH, THE LAW OF Eunm= DoAni in Tim Uzzrrn STaES
c. III (1894), hereinafter cited as RA ILPH; MILLs, O-N, THE LAW or Emnxz.,-r Do-
mAxfr cc. II, III (2d ed. 1888), hereinafter cited as MILLs; RorrscHAErER, HA..mzou
OF AMmICAN CoNsTrrmtnoNAI. LAw §§294-5 (1939); 3 WNILLOUGmDy, THE Cozsrru-
TioxAL LAW OF THE UNrrED STATs c. XCIX (2d ed. 1979) ; 2 CooLY, Co.sTrrrTUrroAL
LntrrATIONS 1124-41 (8th ed. 1927).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); Room Co. v. Patter-
son,.98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878); County of San Mateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 634, 63 Pac.
78, 79 (1900); Chestatee Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders Creek Gold Mining Co., 119 Ga. 354,
355, 46 S.E. 422, 423 (1904) ; Hollister v. State, 9 Idaho 8, 11, 71 Pac. 541, 543 (1903) ;
Ill. State Trust Co. v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry., 208 Ill. 419, 422, 70 N.E. 357, 358 (1904) ;
Board of Regents v. Palmer, 356 Mo. 946, 951, 204 SAV. 2d 291, 2793 (1947) ; Jacobs v.
Clearview Water Supply Co., 220 Pa. 388, 392-4, 69 Atl. 870, 871 (1903) ; Painter v. St.
Clair, 98 Va. 85, 87-8, 34 S.E. 989, 990 (1900).
See, also, LEwis §§ 3, 367; MIus § 1; NIcHoLs § 17; RoTmscAEFun, HAmaoa or
AmzRCAN CoNsTTUTIONAL LAW 691 (1939) ; Notes, 21 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv 285 (1946),
46 Co. L. RE v. 108 (1946). But see FruND, THE POLICE PowEn 541 (college ed. 1904).
3. The case first establishing the Federal Government's eminent domain power was
Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875), presaged in People ex rel. Trombley v.
Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471 (1871) where a state was denied the power to condemn for the
United States. "
Prior to 1875, the usual procedure had been for a state to condemn property and
turn it over to the United States. See Reddall v. Bryan, 14 Md. 444 (1859), appeal dis-
vissed, 24 How. 420 (U.S. 1860) ; Orr v. Quimby, 54 N.H. 590 (1874) ; In the Matter
of League Island, 1 Brewst. 524 (Pa. 1868). Consult LEwIs §309; MnIs §347;
NICHOLS § 34; RANDOLPH § 33. There were, however, instances where the United States,
as nominal condemnor, was deemed to be exercising a delegated power of the state.
United States v. Dumplin Island, 1 Barb. 24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847); cf., Burt v. Mer-
chants' Ins. Co., 106 Mass. 356 (1871).
4. The eminent domain clause in the Fifth Amendment--"nor shall private prop-
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reviewed in the federal forum. Accordingly, until the last decade of the
last century, the law of eminent domain developed primarily in the state
courts and only gradually thereafter did the federal bench begin to make
significant contribution.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE IN THE STATE COURTS
Prior to the adoption of the federal and early state constitutions, govern-
ments rarely needed privately owned land. 5 There were vast tracts available
in the public domain and governmental activities were limited. And the
abundance of unimproved and unoccupied private lands made the few in-
stances of government acquisition relatively painless.! Accordingly, the
only significant limitation imposed upon the rare exercise of eminent do-
main was the payment of just compensation.
7
This requirement was written into the federal 8 and a few state constitu-
tions, but was so generally accepted as a principle of "natural law" that a
number of early state constitutions omitted it. Indeed, the courts of the
time, even where express constitutional provisions existed, preferred to
rely on natural law.10
erty be taken for a public use, without just compensation"-is not directly applicable to
the states, but the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the same
requirements. Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 US, 403, 417 (1896); Fallbrook
Irrigation District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896) ; Chicago Burlington & Quincy
R. R v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897); cf. Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co,,
113 U.S. 9, 20 (1885). But see Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877).
5. The governmental power to take private property doubtless goes back as far as
formalized governmeit, but the term "eminent domain" was not coined by political phi-
losophers until the modem concept of private property emerged from the decline of
feudalism. Nic1oLs 4-5, 22-3; LEwis 7; FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 504 (college
ed. 1904); RANDOLPH 5. See, also, discussion in Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R.R., 18
Wend. 9, 56-59 (N.Y. 1837).
6. So painless that originally no duty existed to compensate the owner of unim-
proved land When roads were laid through it. See NIcHoLs 14. In the southern colonies,
where there was less urban development, the practice of laying out highways without
just compensation persisted even longer; and South Carolina not only took land without
compensation, but timber, stones and other material as well, a custom which prevailed
until long after the Revolution. See State v. Dawson, 3 Hill. 100 (S.C. 1836) ; NicuoLs
19; cf. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminwnt Domain, 6 Wis.
L. REv. 67, 80-81 (1931).
7. For the history of the development of the just compensation requirement, con-
sult NicHOLS §§ 3, 204; 2 Lxwvs § 671 et seq.
8. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
9. The first constitutions of most of the original states lacked any provisions per-
taining to eminent domain. Massachusetts and Vermont were alone in requiring com-
pensation-Pennsylvania was alone in requiring the consent of the landowner "or that of
his legal representatives." By 1800, Pennsylvania had changed its constitution to re-
quire compensation, but in 1868, five of the original states were still without this guaran-
tee. Most of the states later admitted to the Union provided for compensation in their
constitutions. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Emnent Domaih,
6 Wis. L. Rnv. 67, 70 (1931).
10. Ibid; LEwis §§ 10, 11; NicHOLs 622.
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The same higher justice considered eminent domain justified for the
public "good," 1n the public "necessity," 12 or the public "utility." "1 As
governmental activity expanded, these concepts became significant, for
property-owners threatened with expropriation attempted to show that the
proposed takings were for projects unrelated to the public good. In a num-
ber of states, where the desire was strong to encourage exploitation of nat-
ural wealth and to increase industrial development, the courts found-and,
on further exploration, still find-the natural law concept of "public good"
to be of wondrous elasticity. 14 In these jurisdictions, in consequence, at-
tempts to take property by eminent domain have rarely been invalidated.
For example, a taking of land for the construction of a private road to be
used only by the landowner on whose behalf it was constructed v, as approved
as a "public use" on the theory that it provided a means for the homeowner
to leave his home to vote and to serve on juries; a" again, a grant of eminent
domain to a private gold mining enterprise was justified by the relationship
of gold to the national currency.
IG
But the country was undergoing a great industrial transformation. To
accelerate this movement, many states delegated eminent domain to favored
11. See 1 Br- Couar. *139.
12. The French Declaration of Rights of 1789, Article 17, provides: "Los propr etes
9tant m; drat inviolable et sacrg, var ne pett ca itre priv si cc e'st lorsque la nJccssit6
publiq2ee, lgalemcnt constatee, l'exigc 6izqdcmnent, at sovs ia conditio; d'nnc juste ct
prialable indemniti." DAGun, Axiosins, Ap'onismxs nr Bnoc.nns FA: ATs rz Drorr
183 (1926).
13. GRoTrus, DE JuRE BEL.i Er PAcIs Lib. II, Cap. XIV, § vii, indicates public
utility and compensation as the two requirements of eminent domain.
14. Nicnois 130-1; LEwns 504; CusHSIAN, Excnss CONDEMNATioI 2zT- (1917);
Nichols, The Meanhng of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L.RnV. 615,
618-24 (1940) ; Note, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q. RLT. 285, 286 (1946).
" .. [I]t is enough if the taking tends to enlarge resources, increase the industrial
energies and promote the productive power of any considerable part of the inhabitants of
a section of the state, or leads to the growth of tons and the creation of new channels
for the employment of private capital and labor, as such results indirectly contribute to
the general prosperity of the whole community." Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12
Idaho 769, 785, 88 Pac. 426, 431 (1906).
15. See Brewer v. Bowman, 9 Ga. 37, 40-1 (1850) ; Robinson v. Swol, 12 Bush. 21,
24-5 (Ky. 1876). Some courts accomplished the same objective with more directness.
See Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland, 126 Ky. 656, 104 SMW. 762 (1907); People
ex rel. Ayres v. Richards, 38 Mich. 214 (1878).
16. Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Parker, 59 Ga. 419 (1877). Comparable rationaliza-
tions vere offered for grants to private lumbering projects, State ex rel. Clark v. Su-
perior Court, 62 Wash. 612, 114 Pac. 444 (1911) (boom companies compared to common
carriers) ; State ex rel. Wilson v. Superior Court, 47 VWash. 397, 92 Pac. 269 (1907)
(timber driving company having serviced only the company which owns it, nevertheless,
performs a "public" service). Bridal Veil Lumbering Co. v. Johnson, 30 Ore. 205, 46
Pac. 790 (1896) (land may be taken for railroad the main purpose of which is to carry
logs to sawmill because railroad is open to public, is permanent, and will be useful for
settling area).
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enterprises,1 7 railroads being the principal beneficiaries. As the exercise of
the power became more prevalent, the courts began to seek limitations in
the interest of protecting private property.1 8 Moreover, the judicial-legisla-
tive struggle for supremacy was well begun. 9 It may not then be altogether
coincidental that some courts, having already started in other fields to
abandon "natural law" for strict constitutional interpretation, began seek-
ing their definition of the scope of eminent domain in the written constitu-
tion.20 By adroit construction, if not sophistic inference, severe limitations
could be imposed: the power of eminent domain is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty and exists without constitutional recognition; therefore, con-
17. On the delegation of eminent domain, see LHwis §§ 370-4, 376-8; MLLs §§ 60-4;
2 NICHOLS § 346 et seq.; RANDOLPH §§ 101-21.
18. See Nichols, The Afeaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20
B.U.L.REv. 615, 617-8 (1940).
"It seems to us, if railroad corporations were permitted ad libitum to do what this
defendant in error asks to be done, 'no deadlier blow could be dealt the private rights of
the citizens.' If the doctrine claimed by defendant in error should prevail, then corpora-
tions might go to any private place they chose, to rolling-mills, ice-houses, tanneries,
sugar-refineries, brick-yards, grocery-stores etc., and in the country to stone-quarries,
coal-mines, stock-farms etc., and, if any private citizen dared to stand in the way, vio-
lently wrest his property from him for their mere private gain. In such a state of affairs
the so-called protection by the constitution of the rights of private property would by
the arbitrary ruling of the courts be rendered nugatory and void. The mere declaration
in a petition, that the property is to be appropriated to public use does not make it so;
and evidence, that the public will have a right to use it, amounts to nothing in the face
of the fact, that the only incentive to ask for the condemnation was a private gain, and
it was apparent, that the general public had no interest in it.
"We would do nothing to hinder the development of the State nor to cripple rail-
road companies in assisting such development, but at the same time we must protect the
property-rights of the citizens. Whatever corporations may be entitled under a proper
construction of the law they will receive; but they must not be permitted to take private
property for private use." Railroad Co. v. Iron Works, 31 W.Va. 710, 735, 8 S.E. 453,
467 (1888).
See, also, Howard Mills Co. v. Schwartz L.&C. Co., 77 Xan. 599, 609, 95 Pac. 559,
562 (1908); Arnsperger v. Crawford, 101 Md. 247, 253, 61 Atl. 413, 417 (1905) ; Blood-
good v. Mohawk & H.R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 65 (N.Y. 1837) (concurring opinion of Senator
Tracy); Borden v. Trespalacios R.&Y. Co., 98 Tex, 494, 509, 86 S.W. 11, 14 (1905)
Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74 Pac. 681, 684-5 (1903).
19. When the "public interest" is the only limitation on the power of eminent do-
main, "is 'there any limitation which can be set to the exertion of the legislative will in
the appropriation of private property?" Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. R. R., 18 Wend. 9,
60 (N.Y. 1837) (concurring opinion of Senator Tracy). "It seems to me that such a
construction of legislative powers is inconsistent with secure possession and enjoyment of
private property.. . ." Id. at 62.
See, also, NICHOLS 31-40, 130; Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of
Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L.REv. 615, 618 (1940).
20. NiCioLs 119-120; Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent
Domain, 20 B. U. L. Ray. 615, 616 (1940); cf. Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall,
655 (U.S. 1874), discussed in Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of Emitent Do-
main, 6 Wis. L. REv. 67, 68 (1931).
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stitutional provisions relating to eminent domain must be construed as
limitations upon, rather than grants of, power; and, in order to give the
words "public use" in the typical phrase "nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation" any meaning at all, it must
be carefully defined.
2 '
"Use by the Public" Test
Eagerly, the courts seized upon their task of definition. By the middle
of the nineteenth century, the definition had grown quite narrow. 22 A dis-
tinction, originating in an unsupported New York dictum,2 ,was drawn be-
tween a purpose beneficial to the public and a purpose in which the public
had a "right of use." The indirect contribution to the prosperity of the
entire community resulting from activities from which only some individuals
would profit was not sufficient to justify the exercise of eminent domain.
It was necessary that the public possess a "right" to use the facility or
service for which the property was desired.
2 4
This distinction was not only consonant with the commonly understood
meaning of the term "public use"-a public use exists when the public uses
something-but was also hailed as a definitive test which would remove the
question from the realm of speculation..
2 1
The refinement proved, however, somewhat disappointing to the courts
which adopted it. For example, what proportion of the public must have a
right of use before a purpose could be said to justify the exercise of eminent
domain? 2' What of situations where the public was to pay for the privilege
21. See LEWiS § 256; NICHOLS 120; Nichols, The Meaning of Pt:blie Use in the Law
of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L.Rsv. 615, 616 (1940) ; RANouLPH § 39. See, also, cases and
authorities cited note 3 supra.
22. Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.
L. Rnv. 615, 617 (1940).
23. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. ILR., 18 Wend. 9, 60-1 (N.Y. 1837) (concurring
opinion of Senator Tracy). This suit was one for trespass quare claustma fregit against
defendant railroad which had entered upon and damaged plaintiff's land. The railroad
justified its entry under its acts of incorporation giving it the power of eminent domain.
The main question was whether this grant of eminent domain was constitutional. A
secondary question was whether the act required payment of compensation prior to the
entry upon the land. Held: the legislature has the constitutional power to authorize the
taldng of private property for the purpose of constructing railroads, but that "by the true
construction of the defendants' charter or act of incorporation, they were not authorized
to take and appropriate the plaintiff's land to their use ... until his damages were ap-
praised and paid... !' Id. at 78.
24. Id. at 64. See Lawis 506; NICHOLS 129; Mui.s 94; RA.iwoLP- § 56; Note, 21
N.Y.TJ.L.Q.Rv. 285, 290 (1946).
25. See Luwis §258; Cusmmtx, Excass Co:wnarATro,; 279.40 (1917); Note, 21
N.Y.U.L.Q. Rv. 285, 287-8 (1946).
26. 'It is sufficient that the general public, or any considerable portion thereof,
should have the right to the use." Jacobs v. Clearview Water Supply Co., 220 Pa. 338,
393, 69 AtI. 870, 872 (1903). '" . . [B]ut a use which, by physical conditions, is re-
stricted to a very few persons who must use it within a very restricted area, is not a
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of using the thing for which eminent domain was to be employed? Was
this a "right" of use? 2 Where public utilities took property by eminent
domain, would not private individuals alone-the stockholders-profit
directly from the taking? 28
Tradition, however, furnished a far greater obstacle than the cases raising
these sticky questions. The test might permit a taking for the construction
of theaters and hotels which, of course, would be used by the public; yet
these had never before been thought to justify eminent domain.20 On the
other hand, since the beginning of the century eminent domain had been
employed to further certain private activities. When this assistance had
first been given, constitutions limiting the powers of the legislatures had
not yet been written, and the abundance of natural resources had made
people considerably less scrupulous regarding property rights.8" These ac-
tions had been too long sanctioned for the courts not now to sustain them.8"
Accordingly, the courts invoked evasive and awkward rationales, or ad-
mitted the existence of exceptions to the test.
The Mill Acts presented the problem in its trickiest form. These acts
were, for the most part, carry-overs from the colonial period when mills
public use." Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Koochiching Co., 97 Minn. 429, 452, 107
N.W. 405, 414 (1906); see Matter of Split Rock Cable Road Co., 128 N.Y. 408, 416,
28 N.E. 506, 508 (1891) ; Matter of Niagara Falls & Whirlpool'Ry., 108 N.Y. 375, 386,
15 N.E. 429, 432-3 (1888). See also discussion and cases cited in Lnvxs § 254; MILLS
§ 12; NicHoLs §46; RAoLPH § 56.
27. The fact, that the public had to pay to use the facility created by the exercise of
eminent domain did not bring the purpose within the prohibitions of the "use by the
public" test so long as the condemnor was required inter alia to render impartial service
to all and to charge tolls regulated by law. Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn,
166 U.S. 685, 694 (1897); see, Great Western Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Hawkins, 30
Ind. App. 557, 66 N.E. 765 (1903) ; Washington ex rel. Tacoma Industrial Co. v. White
River Power Co., 39 Wash. 648, 82 Pac. 150 (1905); Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648
(1871). See also LEwis § 313; Mu.Ls §§ 13, 14.
28. "The authorities concur in holding that an enterprise organized to meet a public
demand is not reduced in its character because the parties instituting it have primarily in
view private profit. Notwithstanding this it is still impressed with a public use." Ryan
v. Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. 111, 125, 50 S.W. 744, 747 (1899). Sec Cottrill v. Myrick,
12 Me. 222, 233 (1835) ; Gardner Water Co. v. Inhabitants of Gardner, 185 Mass. 190,
.194, 69 N.E. 1051, 1053 (1904) ; NicHoLs § 48; RAxDOLPH § 54.
29. See Dayton G. & S. Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 410-11 (1876) where
the court, in adopting the public "utility, benefit and advantage" construction of public
use, points out that "[i]f public occupation and enjoyment of the object for which the
land is to be condemned furnishes the only and true test for the right of eminent domain,
then the legislature would certainly have the constitutional authority to condemn the lands
of any private citizen for the purpose of building hotels and theaters . . . " and that
"lilt is certain that this view, if literally carried out to the utmost extent, would lead to
very absurd results, if it did not entirely destroy the security of the private rights of
individuals." This objection is also made at NicHoLs 132.
30. NICHOLS § 82.
31. Ibid.; LEwis 552-3; cf. 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATIJTOIY CotsTRUcIT0u
134 .(2d ed. 1904). But see Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 334 (1859).
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were essential to community existence. In general, the statutes authorized
riparian owners to erect and maintain mills on the condition that upstream
landowners would be compensated for any floodings caused by the mills'
operation.3 2 No clearer instance of a taking of property for the benefit of
private individuals could be presented, and literal application of the "use
by the public" test would seemingly require invalidation.33
In some instances the acts were reluctantly sustained by opinions in-
dicating that, had the problem been new, opposite decisions would have
resulted. 34 Other courts relied upon the continued public acquiescence in
the validity of the Acts,35 and a number of courts termed the statutes
omnipotent "police regulations." ^-
By the beginning of the present century, there had developed a massive
32. E.g., LAws OF ALABAMA 623-6 (Toulmin, 1823) (Act of 1811 as amended by Act
of 1812) ; 2 LAws OF KENTUCY 933-9 (Littell & Swigert, 1822) (Act of 1797) ; 2 LAws
OF MfAsSAcHUsErrs 344-7 (Thomas, 1799) (Act of 1796 amending Acts of 1706, 1713 and
1728) ; THE PuBLIc LAWS OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND Pnovxnz.c. PsA.NrA-
Tioxns 374-7 (1822) (Acts of 1734, 1738 and 1798) ; 3 LAws OF SOur Cer.LINA 669-10
(Cooper, 1838), 4 Id. 540 (Act of 1744 revived in 1783 after a 36 year lapse) ; 6 Lws
oF VmGiNI 55-60 (Hening, 1819) (Act of 1748).
Head i% Amoskeag Manufacturing Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885), the case in which the
New Hampshire Mill Act was held not to 6olate the Fourteenth Amendment, contains
a comprehensive discussion of the various Mill Acts in effect throughout the states.
The Mill Acts are also discussed in: ANGELa A Tm,_TiSE- O,- iHE L., oF ra A -
coURsEs c. XII (7th ed. 1877) ; Go.uw, A TmEATrE ON THE LAw or VATEns §R 253, 2S4
and c. XIV (3d ed. 1900); LEwis §§ 275-0; NICos §§ 83, 84. A brief discussion is
also contained in 2 COOLEY, CoNsrrurlo.MA LnxrrAvious 1134 ct seq. (8th ed. 1927).
Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L.Rsv. 615,
619-21 (1940) contains a more sophisticated analysis.
33. "The property in such cases is not taken into possession and Ue by the public
... nor ... do the individuals composing the public, derive any direct use, profit or
convenience from them. ... except insofar as the public... is incidentally banefitted by
those enterprises which reduce the powers of nature to the service of man:' Miller v.
Troost, 14 Mlinn. 365, 368 (1869). See LvIs §278.
34. See, e.g., Fleming v. Hull, 73 Iowa 598, 602, 35 N.V. 673, 675 (1837) ; Harding
v. Funk 8 Kan. 315, 324 (1871) ; Murdock v. Stickney, S Cush. 113, 117 (Mass. 1851) ;
Stowell v. Flagg, 11 Mass. 364, 363 (1814) ; Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 355, 369 (1859) ;
Fisher v. Horicon Iron & Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351, 353 (1860).
35. See, e.g., Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 552 (1866); Mfiller v. Troost, 14
Minn 365, 369 (1869) ; AIGELL, A Trxwis Oi THE LAw oF WATmncoutss, 651 (7th
ed. 1877); NICHOLS 227; cf., SuTHERLaND, STATUTEs Aim STAT T oy Co-svuM-xCnoN,
134 (2d ed. 1904Y. But see, Sadler v. Langhamn, 34 Ala. 311, 334 (1859) where this argu-
ment was considered and rejected. Consider Lrwis § 278.
36. This approach was popular in Massachusetts. See Lowell v. City of Boston, 111
Mlass. 454, 466-7 (1873) ; Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co., 12 Pick 67, 70 (Mass. 1832) ;
Murdock v. Stickney, 8 Cush. 113, 116 (Mass. 1851). But see Chase Y. Sutton Mfg. Co.,
4 Cush. 152, 169-70 (Mass. 1849).
The "Massachusetts Doctrine" may be credited to the inventive genius of Chief
Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. See Nicholas, The J'caring
of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L.REV. 615, 619-20 (1940); LvL s
§ 280. See generally, L.wls § 279; NICHOLS § 84.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
body of case law, irreconcilable in its inconsistency, confusing in its detail
and defiant of all attempts at classification. 31 The exceptions became so
wide and so numerous that the "use by the public" test was no longer an
important impediment to the requirements of transportation, mining and
agricultural enterprises, nor, for that matter, to the needs of industry at
large."
An offspring of the "use by the public" test, however-the rejection of
"excess condemnation"-continued to cause difficulty.
Excess condemnation 19 is the practice of taking more property than is
physically necessary for the creation of a public improvement and subse-
quently selling or leasing the surplus." It provides an effective method of
controlling the development of the area immediately surrounding the public
improvement, since the condemnor can sell or lease -subject to any restric-
tions which it deems desirable. Furthermore, since compensation which
37. "No question has ever been submitted to the courts upon which there is greater
variety and conflict of reasoning and result than that presented as to the meaning of the
words 'public use'. . .. The reasoning is in many of the cases as unsatisfactory as the
results have been uncertain. The beaten path of precedent to which courts, when it
doubt, seek refuge, here furnishes no safe guide .... The authorities are so diverse and
conflicting, that no matter which road the court may take it will be sustained, and op-
posed, by about an equal number of the decided cases. In this dilemma, the meaning
must, in every case, be determined by the common sense of each individual judge who
has the power of deciding it.". Dayton G. & S. Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 400-1
(1876). Cf. it re United States, 28 F. Supp. 758, 761 (W.D.N.Y. 1939); Oury v.
Goodwin, 3 Ariz. 255, 262, 26 Pac. 376, 378 (1891) ; Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel Mining
& Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 595, 83 Pac. 464, 465 (1906).
The commentators have also had difficulties: 2 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TiONS, 1129 (8th ed. 1927) ("We find ourselves somewhat at sea, however, when we
undertake to define, in the light of the judicial decisions, what constitutes a public use.") ;
CUSHMAN, ExcEss CONDEMNATION 277 (1917) ("One who seeks to find in the utter-
ances of courts a clear statement of the meaning of the term 'public use' is doomed to
disappointment. He finds chaos and conflict rather than unanimity or even similarity of
opinion!') ; Lmvs 505 ("It is, of course, impossible to reconcile these different views.
. .."); NIcHOLS 128-9 ("Efforts have been continually made to find a concise defi-
nition which will embrace all the undertakings which may be constitutionally endowed
with the power of eminent domain and will exclude all others, but the task has never
been accomplished. The difficulty is due in part to the impossibility of reconciling the
decisions of the courts of the various states, or even of the same state .. ").
38. See Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20
B.U.L.Rrv. 615, 624 (1940).
39. CusHMANr, ExcEss CONDEMNATION (1917) is the outstanding work on the sub-
ject and is still helpful despite the fact that it is more than thirty years old. For more
recent treatments, see Hart, Excess Condemnation--A Solution of Some Problems of
Urban Life, 11 MARQ. L. REv. 222 (1927) ; Nichols, Excess Condemnation it Connection
with Housing, 4 LEGAL NOTES ON LocAL Gov. 14 (1938) ; Steiner, Excess Condemtnation,
3 Mo. L. Rxv. 1 (1938) ; Note, The Constitutionality of Excess Condemnation, 46 COL.
L. REV. 108 (1946).
40. CUSHMAN, op. cit. supra note 39, at 2; Hart, supra note 39, at 226; 46 Cot,, L.
REv. 108 (1946).
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the condemnor pays for the acquisition of the property is generally con-
siderably less than the value of the property after the creation of the im-
provement, the profits thus realized aid in defraying the cost of the improve-
ment itself. 41 These advantages made excess condemnation increasingly
popular among the states and cities,42 but courts occasionally outlawed it
as violating the requirement that the taking must be for a public useA3 But
to invalidate these takings, the courts applied not a broad conception of
"public use" but rather the narrow test of whether the public has a "right of
use." 4 The antipathy to "excess condemnation" flourished during the
early decades of the present century. But within the last fifteen years, it
appears, no state court has outlawed the technique.
The expanding social philosophy of the present century has brought in
the state courts an almost complete abandonment of the "use by the pub-
lic" test.45 Symptomatic are the housing and slum clearance cases of the
last decade. In 1937, Congress enacted a housing statute 1 which granted
federal subsidies to states which would condemn slum areas and construct
homes for the use of families which could not otherwise afford them. Emi-
nent domain was, of course, necessary to execute this program. Since, how-
ever, the dwellings for which the eminent domain power was to be employed
41. Cus~rAN, op. cit. supra note 39, at II, III, IV; Hart, supra note 39, at 226;
46 CoL L. Rrv. 108 (1946) ; Nichols, supra note 39, at 14.
42. Many states, for example, have passed constitutional amendments expressly per-
mitting excess condemnation. See, e.g., OHIo CoNsr. Anry. XVIII, § 10; Mxc. Cou;sT.
Axr. XIII, § 5; MAss. CoNsT. Amrscrx.s oF A=D,1_wr, Anr. XXKIX; Mo. Co.Isr.
ART. I, §27; N.Y. CoNsr. ART. I, §7(e); Wis. Coxsr. Arr. XI, §3B.
43. Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 204 Mass. 607, 91 N.E.
405 (1910) (advisory opinion); Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242
Pa. 47, 88 AtI. 904 (1913); Richmond v. Carneal, 129 Va. 381, 106 S.E. 403 (1921).
See also CusHmAN op. cit. supra note 39, at 305; Hart, supra note 39, at 233; 46 CoL. L
Rnv. 108, 111 (1946).
44. E.g., "Applying the doctrine that to constitute a public use for which private
property may be appropriated there must be a use or right of use by the public it i6
apparent, we think, that the sections of the Act of 1907 authorizing the acquisition of
private property outside a ... parkway... are not a constitutional exercise of legis-
lative authority. It will be observed that these sections confer authority to appropriate
and resell with such restrictions as may be prescribed property outside the lines of the
parkway, and it is justified by declaring that it is done in order to protect the parlvay
and for 'the preservation of the view, appearance, light, air, health or usefulness thereof.'
The protection of the highway is the only 'public use' to which the land is to be applied.
The property is not to be taken and held by the city for any use for which a statute con-
fers on the city the right to appropriate it. Saving the restriction contained in the con-
veyance, the city can exercise no control over it, and hence cannot use it for any pur-
pose... The use to be made of the property located outside a public highway is not a
public use for which private property may be taken by the city.. .. " Pennsylvania
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia, 242 Pa. 47, 55-56, 88 Atl. 904, 907 (1913).
45. Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Dotnaifn, 20 B.U.
L.RLv. 615, 626 (1940); Comment, Public Land Ownership, 52 YAa L. J. 634, 640
(1943). Cf. Laughlin v. City of Portland, 111 le. 486, 492, 90 At. 318, 321 (1914).
46. 50 STAT. 888 (1937), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-30 (1940).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
were for the use of only those individuals who would lease them, such ac.
quisitions could well have run afoul of the "use by the public" test. But
twenty-two state courts of last resort have endorsed the takings as being
constitutionally unobjectionable,r following the lead of the New York
Court of Appeals in New York City Housing Atthority v. Muller.43 Thus the
state which created the narrow doctrine of "use by the public" has taken
the vanguard in its final demolition.
Although the "use by the public" test continues to be raised occasionally
by counsel litigating state takings, its effect is virtually nil. Emptied of
its only tangible content, the doctrine of "public use" itself loses all prac-
tical significance. True, even a broad concept of "public use" implies a
limitation, and many state courts still accord vocal acknowledgment to
the concept. But they invariably find that the particular project under
consideration is satisfactorily public in nature.4"
EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Takings by States
Toward the end of the last century, the Supreme Court held that the
"due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from
taking private property for a private useA° This interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment, of course, gave the federal courts the power to circum-
scribe the states' exercise of eminent domain by whatever theory of public
use they chose to adopt. And by this time both the "use by the public" test
and the vaguer notion of public benefit and advantage had crystallized into
two well-established lines of authority,"
In the cases first presenting the question, the Supreme Court was careful
to avoid adopting either test. Instead, it sanctioned, on the ground of
peculiar conditions within the particular state, state condemnations which
might otherwise have fallen afoul of the "use by the public" test." Then
47. See cases collected in McDougal and Mueller, Public Purpose ins Publia Housing:
An Anachronism Reburied, 52 YALz L. J. 42, 46 n. 13 (1942).
48. 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E2d 153 (1936),
49. E.g., Amalgamated Housing Corp. v. Kelly, 82 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
50. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896); see Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) ; Fallbrook Irrigation
Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158 (1896).
51. See CUSHM~rAN, op. cit. supra note 39, at 279 (1917).
52. E.g., "It is obvious, however, that what is a public use frequently and largely
depends upon facts and circumstances surrounding the particular subject matter in re-
gard to which the character of the use is questioned." Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v.
Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 159-60 (1896). "Where the use is asserted to be public, and the
right of the individual to condemn land for the purpose of exercising such use is founded
upon or is the result of some peculiar condition of the soil or the climate, or other pe-
culiarity of the state ... we are always, where it can fairly be done, strongly inclined
to hold with the state courts, when they uphold a state statute providing for such con-
demnation." Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 367-8 (1905).
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the Court bowed to the other side of the argument by declaring that "we
do not be desired [sic] to be understood ... as approving of the broad
proposition that private property may be taken in all cases where the taking
may promote the public interest and tend to develop the natural resources
of the State." 13 Mr. Justice Moody tersely summarized the Court's record
up to 1908: "No case can be recalled where this court has condemned as a
violation of the 14th Amendment a taking upheld by a state court as a tak-
ing for public uses in conformity with its laws." " In 1916 the Supreme
Court expressly repudiated the "use by the public" test as applied to state
takings 55 and thereafter consistently refused to recognize itY15
Federal Takings
Once the Federal Government's power of eminent domain had been es-
tablished in 1875,5 it became necessary for the courts to determine what
limitation the doctrine of public use placed upon federal takings. Con-
veniently waiting was the case law which had been developed by the state
courts dealing with state constitutional provisions similar or identical with
the federal provision.'* But the fundamental political difference in the
character of the state and federal governments-states are complete sov-
ereigns except for those powers taken from them by the Federal Constitu-
tion; the Federal Government is a government only of delegated powers '-
presented a question which state courts did not deal with under state con-
stitutions.
As a result, in the early federal condemnation cases in which the question
53. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905).
54. Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry. Co., 203 U.S. 599, C07 (1903). Justice
Moody apparently overlooked or read narrowly Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraslm, 164
U.S. 403 (1896). There the highest Nebraska court had refused to invalidate a taling
in the face of an argument that the taking -was of private property for a private use,
State v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 29 Neb. 550, 45 N.V. 785 (1S90). The United States
Supreme Court reversed, saying, at 417: "[T]he order in question, so far as it required
the railroad corporation to surrender a part of its land to the petitioners, for the purpa;e
of building and maintaining their elevator upon it, was, in essence and effect, a taking of
private property of the railroad corporation, for the private use of petitioners. The taking
by a state of the private property of one person or corporation, without the owner's
consent, for the private use of another, is not due process of law, and is a violation of
the Fourteenth Article of Amendment of the Constitution.'
55. "The inadequacy of the use by the general public as a universal test is estab-
lished." Mr. Justice Holmes in Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama
Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916).
56. See Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 262 U.S. 710, 719 (1923);
Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921); Hendersonville Light & Power Co. v. Blue
Ridge Interurban Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 563, 570 (1917).
57. See note 3 szpra.
58. The eminent domain provision in the Fifth Amendment has been the model for
the provisions in most state constitutions. See, e.g., An. CousT. AnT. II, §22; CAr..
CoNsT. AR. I, § 14; CoNx. CoNsT. AnT. I, § 11.
59. U. S. Cos~sT. ASS-nD. X.
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of public use was raised, two streams of inquiry appear simultaneously. The
first is whether the use is a public one; the second, whether the Federal
Government has the constitutional power to condemn for the proposed
public use."0
As was the case with the public use limitation in state condemnations, the
Supreme Court in dealing with federal condemnations did not make an
early choice between the "use by the public" test and the broad public
benefit theory. The early federal takings were for activities which could
have withstood the rigours of the "use by the public" test, such as parks 01
and national monuments, 2 and therefore, a choice was not essential. In
later cases, however, it became apparent that federal takings were not
being subjected to the "use by the public" test but were to be upheld if they
were beneficial or advantageous to the public. 3
On the issue of constitutional power, the Supreme Court in early cases
implied such power as a concomitant of the powers expressly delegated to
the United States by the Constitution." 4 More recently, a lower federal
60. Although judicial discussions of these questions are not outstanding examples
of organizational analysis, the problems are treated as separate and distinct. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (taking land for war
memorial park is for a public use and power comes from national defense powers among
others); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893) (taking land for a park is
for a public use and power to do so in the District of Columbia stems from "district
clause" of Constitution) ; Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641,
657 (1890) (taking of right-of-way for railroad constitutional under the commerce power,
and railroads are a public use).
61. See Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893).
62. United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896). Other early
takings were for post-offices, Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); and light-
houses, Chappell v. United States, 160 U.S. 499 (1896).
63. In Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 83 (1923), the right of the Federal
Government to condemn property for the purpose of awarding it to the condemnee of
another federal condemnation was upheld. See, also, Old Dominion Land Co. v. United
States, 292 Fed. 20, 22 (4th Cir. 1924) aff'd 269 U.S. 55 (1925), upholding a federal
taking for the purpose of avoiding financial loss to the United States; and International
Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931), where the property expropriated was
to be turned over to private corporations. In the latter case, the United States, the taker,
argued that the taking was not for a public use in order to avoid being required to pay
just compensation; this unique situation may weaken the case as a precedent.
64. United States v. Gettysburg Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) has often been relied
upon in subsequent decisions. The language most directly in point is: "The government
has the constitutional power to condemn the land for the proposed use. It is, of course,
not necessary that the power of condemnation for such purposes be expressly given by
the Constitution. The right to condemn at all is not so given. It results from the powers
that are given, and it is implied because of its necessity, or because it is appropriate in
exercising those powers." Id. at 681. The Court cites in support the words of Chief
Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (U.S. 1819): "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adequate to that end, which are not prohibited, but coll-
sist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
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court paraphrased this to mean that the United States has the power to
condemn "when it is necessary and proper to do so in carrying out its fed-
eral powers." 65 The expressly delegated powers with which the federal
exercise of eminent domain has been allied have included the commerce
power," the power to raise armies,7 and the power to legislate for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 3
Within the last decade there has been a tendency on the part of the lower
federal courts to blend the two limitations-public use and constitutional
power-into one. Thus, when the United States sought to acquire lands
for the purpose of creating an Indian reserve,cl the court addressed itself
first to the question of whether the Federal Government had the constitu-
tional power to act as a guardian of the Indians. After finding such power
in the commerce clause, the court decided that the United States could
constitutionally acquire the land in question, concluding that "it is a public
use if the project comes within the purview of federal power." " Similarly,
where the United States sought to acquire certain lands for the purpose of
preserving an historic site, the court, in addressing itself to the objection
that the land was not to be taken for a public use, stated: "If the Federal
Government, under the Constitution, has the power to embark upon the
project for which the land is sought, then the use is a public one." 71
It was in the light of this background that the Supreme Court in 1946
65. "The right of the United States to condemn land is recognized when it is neces-
sary and proper to do so in carrying out its federal powers." United States v. 4,450.72
Acres of Land, Clearwater County, State of Minnesota, 27 F. Supp. 167, 174 (D. Minn
1939).
66. See Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641, 657 (1890);
United States v. 4,450.72 Acres of Land, Clearvmter County, State of Minnesota, 27
F. Supp. 167, 173 (D. Minn. 1939).
67. United States v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 663, 631-3 (1896):
"Congress has the power to declare war and to create and equip armies and navies. It
has the great power of taxation to be exercised for the common defense and general
welfare.... The power to condemn for this purpose (the creation of a national par: at
Gettysburg) need not be plainly and unmistakably deduced from any one of the particu-
larly specified powers. Any number of these powers may be grouped together, and an
inference from them all may be drawn that the power claimed has been conferred." See,
also, Barnridge v. United States, 101 F2d 295 (Sth Cir. 1939) upholding the taking of
land possessed of exceptional value as commemorating or illustrating the history of the
United States under the Historic Sites Act.
68. See Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 2,Z 293 (193). That the Federal
Government has the power to condemn to establish parks, see United States v. Diekmann,
101 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1939) ; for purpose of reforestation and forestation, prevention of
forest fires and soil erosion, and flood control, see United States v. Eighty Acres of Land
in Williamson County, Ill., 26 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Ill. 1939); United States v. 546.03
Acres, More or Less, of Land Situate in Union Tp., Bedford County, Pa., 22 F. Supp.
775 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
69. United States v. 4,450.72 Acres of Land, Clearwater County, Minnesota, 27
F. Supp. 167 (D. Minn. 1939).
70. Id. at 174.
71. Bamridge v. United States, 101 F.2d 295, 298 (8th Cir. 1939).
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considered United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch. 8 Its
peculiar fact situation provided the Court with a particularly appropriate
opportunity to indicate its position on the public use limitation.
Under Congressional authorization, the TVA had begun construction of
the great Fontana Dam on the Little Tennessee River in North Carolina.
Essential to the development of the project was the creation of a huge
reservoir which cut off the only road to a rural settlement. The war made
immediate construction of a new road impossible. The TVA volunteered to
pay damages, but the state and county both objected on the ground that
damages would be inadequate to cover police protection and school and
health services for the isolated village. In order to save the state and county
the expensive and temporarily impossible task of providing these services,
the TVA ultimately agreed to acquire the land in the 'isolated area by pur-
chase or condemnation and join it to the adjacent Smoky Mountains Na-
tional Park. Almost all of the land was acquired by purchase. Condemna-
tion proceedings were instituted against the remaining landowners who
contested the taking as not being for a public use.
The district court ruled against the TVA 73 and the circuit court unan-
imously affirmed.74 Writing for the higher bench, Judge Parker unearthed
the "use by the public" test 75 and declared that the TVA's condemnation
did not meet its standard. 7 This was bolstered by terming the condemnation
"excessive" and therefore unconstitutional." Finally, the court found in
the statutes establishing the TVA no authority for such a taking even if it
were for a public use.
78
72. 327 U.S. 546 (1946) ; see Note, 20 So. CALw. L. Rev. 99 (1946).
73. The opinion is not reported.
74. U.S. ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 150 F.2d 613 (4th Cir. 1945).
75. Id. at 617.
76. The precise basis of decision is not clear. Judge Parker says: "The lands here
in question are certainly not being taken for any of the purposes enumerated in the
statute. Their condemnation can be sustained only if they may be taken by the TVA
for use in discharging a liability arising from the taking and flooding of the highway.
This, we think, is taking not for the public use for which the statute gives the right of
condemnation, but for a private use, or at most for a public use not authorized by
statute. .. ." U.S. ex reL. TVA v. Welch, 150 F. 2d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 1945).
77. "The only land which it was necessary for the TVA to take . , . was the land
covered by the reservoir. In taking this, it flooded the highway affording access to the
lands in question. To condemn (these) lands . . . was excess condemnation. . . ." Id.
at 617. Judge Parker relied on Richmond v. Carneal, 129 Va. 388, 106 S.E. 403 (1921),
and City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 33 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1929), in both of which excegs
condemnation was held unconstitutional.
At least technically, judge Parker either (1) erroneously classified the taking in
the Welch case as "excess condemnation," the error being that the term had never be-
fore embraced the use of "excess" lands for so manifestly a public use as a national
park; or (2) exalted "excess condemnation" as a separate constitutional objection un-
related to the "public use" criterion. There is, of course, the further possibility that hle
was attempting to look through form to substance.
78. Id. at 616.
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The Supreme Court reversed, sustaining the condemnation unanimously.n
All of the justices agreed that the taking was for a public use and that the
act establishing the TVA authorized the action. They viewed the taking of
the "additional" land as part of an "inseparable transaction"-the develop-
ment of the Fontana Dam project-and refused to consider the particular
use to which the contested land was to be put.10
Disagreement was registered, however, over the suggestion in the Court's
opinion, written by Justice Black,31 that a legislative declaration of public
use foreclosed judicial review. Justice Reed, with whom Chief Justice Stone
joined, concurring, insisted that the determination of a public use was
always reviewable by the courts.82 Justice Frankfurter, separately con-
curring, read the Court's opinion to include no suggestion of immunity from
judicial review but merely as an exhortation in favor of extreme judicial
deference to the special competence of the legislature.83
The most significant aspect of the Welch decision is its acceptance of the
theory developed in the lower federal courts that, where a federal power
exists, eminent domain may be employed in its exercise. Since a congres-
sional determination of "public use" is to be conclusive, the Court will
henceforth refuse to consider the separate questions of constitutional power
and public use but, having found the one, will assume the existence of the
other. Doctrinally, the concurring justices seem to have denied this pro-
position or denied its propounding. In practical terms, however, since the
Welch case's factual situation was so extreme, it may be cautiously suspected
that the Court is united. Moreover, if the judicial opposition to "excess
condemnation" ever had any doctrinal existence apart from the "public
use" test, the opposition is evidently no longer significant in v.iew of the
Welch opinion's concept of an "inseparable transaction."
The conclusion that follows is that so far as the federal courts are con-
79. Justice Jackson took no part in consideration or decision of the case. Justice
Black wrote the opinion for the Court, Burton, Douglas, Murpby, and Rutledge, JJ.,
joining. Justice Reed and Chief Justice Stone concurred in a separate opinion. Justice
Frankfurter concurred in a separate opinion.
80. "We would do violence to fact were we to break one inseparable transaction into
separate units. We view the entire transaction as a single integrated effort on the part
of the TVA to carry on its congressionally authorized functions." U.S. cx reL. TVA v.
Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552-3 (1946) (Opinion of the Court).
"The acquisition of the whole area was a factor in these arrangements and the
condemnation of these smaller tracts is a part of the transaction." Reed, J, and Stone,
C.J., concurring. Id. at 556.
'I join in the opinion of the Court. . . .' Frankfurter, J., concurring. Id. at 557.
81. "We think it is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for a
public use and that the agency authorized to do the taking may do so to the fullest
eoxtent." Id. at 551-2.
82. "This taking is for a public purpose but whether it is or not is a judicial ques-
tion." Id. at 556.
83. Id. at 557-8.
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cerned neither state legislatures nor Congress need be concerned about the
public use test in any of its ramifications.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has repudiated the doctrine of public use. Most
state courts have arrived at the same conclusion,' although rarely with so
much directness. Doubtless the doctrine will continue to be evoked nostal-
gically in dicta and may even be employed authoritatively in rare, atypical
situations. Kinder hands, however, would accord it the permanent inter-
ment in the digests that is so long overdue.
